II. U.S. NEUTRALITY IN THE FRANCO-VIET MINH WAR, 1946-1949
A. FAILURES OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
The return of the French to Tonkin in March, 1946, created an explosive situation. North Vietnam, a traditionally rice-deficit area, had experienced an extraordinarily bad harvest in 1945. Severe famine was scarcely helped by the concentration of armies in the Red River Delta -- Vietnamese irregular forces, the most numerous belonging to the Viet Minh; some 150,000 Chinese; and then the French Expeditionary Corps. The people were not only hungry, but politically restive; the popular appetite for national independence had been thoroughly whetted by the Viet Minh and the formation of the DRV. While feeling against all foreign occupiers ran high, the French remained the primary target of enmity. But the March 6 Accord deferred a reckoning, serving to mollify extremists in Tonkin, and to dampen guerrilla operations in South Vietnam. The accord in any event underwrote peaceful cooperation between France and the DRV in North Vietnam for eight months.
Yet the March 6 Accord constituted an admission of defeat for Ho Chi Minh, because his policy had been directed toward internationalizing the Indochina problem. Ho made repeated overtures to the United States, to the United Nations, and to China, the USSR, and the U.K. His letters presented eloquent appeals for U.S. or U.N. intervention in Vietnam on the grounds of the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter, the UN. Charter, and on humanitarian grounds. The last such to be forwarded to the U.S. prior to the Accord of 6 March 1946, is summarized in the following telegram from an American diplomat in Hanoi, received in Washington 27 February 1946:
Ho Chi Minh handed me 2 letters addressed to President of USA, China, Russia, and Britain identical copies of which were stated to have been forwarded to other governments named. In 2 letters to Ho Chi Minh request [sic] USA as one of United Nations to support idea of Annamese independence according to Philippines [sic] example, to examine the case of the Annamese, and to take steps necessary to maintenance of world peace which is being endangered by French efforts to reconquer Indochina. He asserts that Annamese will fight until United Nations interfere in support of Annamese independence. The petition addressed to major United Nations contains:
A. Review of French relations with Japanese where French Indochina allegedly aided Japs.
B. Statement of establishment on 2 September 1945 of PENW [sic] Democratic Republic of Viet Minh:
C. Summary of French conquest of Cochin China begun 23 Sept 1945 and still incomplete:
D. Outline of accomplishments of Annamese Government in Tonkin including popular elections, abolition of undesirable taxes, expansion of education and resumption as far as possible of normal economic activities.
E Request to 4 powers: (1) To intervene and stop the war in Indochina in order to mediate fair settlement and (2) to bring the Indochinese issue before the United Nations organization. The petition ends with statement that Annamese ask for full independence in fact and that in interim while awaiting UNO decision the Annamese will continue to fight the reestablishment of French imperialism. Letters and petition will be transmitted to Department soonest.There is no record that the U S encouraged Ho Chi Minh thus to submit his cause to the U.S., beyond the O.S.S. support he received during and immediately after World War II; nor does the record reflect that the U S. responded affirmatively to Ho's petitions. Rather, the U.S. Government appears to have adhered uniformly to a policy of looking to the French rather than to Vietnamese Nationalists for constructive steps toward Vietnamese independence. On 5 December, 1946, after the November incidents, but before the fighting broke out in earnest, State instructed the U.S. diplomatic representative in Hanoi as follows.
Assume you will see Ho in Hanoi and offer following summary our present thinking as guide.
Keep in mind Ho's clear record as agent international communism, absence evidence recantation Moscow affiliations, confused political situation France and support Ho receiving French Communist Party. Least desirable eventuality would be establishment Communist-dominated Moscow-oriented state Indochina in view DEPT, which most interested INFO strength non-communist elements Vietnam. Report fully, repeating or requesting DEPT repeat Paris.
Recent occurrences Tonkin cause deep concern. Consider March 6 accord and modus vivendi as result peaceful negotiation provide basis settlement outstanding questions between France and Vietnam and impose responsibility both sides not prejudice future, particularly forthcoming Fontainebleau Conference, by resort force. Unsettled situation such as pertains certain to offer provocations both sides, but for this reason conciliatory patient attitude especially necessary. Intransigence either side and disposition exploit incidents can only retard economic rehabilitation Indochina and cause indefinite postponement conditions cooperation France and Vietnam which both agree essential.
If Ho takes stand non-implementation promise by French of Cochinchina referendum relieves Vietnam responsibility compliance with agreements. you might if you consider advisable raise question whether he believes referendum after such long disorder could produce worthwhile result and whether he considers compromise on status Cochinchina could possibly be reached through negotiation.
May say American people have welcomed attainments Indochinese in efforts realize praiseworthy aspirations greater autonomy in framework democratic institutions and it would be regrettable should this interest and sympathy be imperilled {SIC -- VWIP} by any tendency Vietnam administration force issues by intransigence and violence.
May inform Ho [U.S. Ambassador Paris] discussing situation French similar frankness. For your INFO, [Foreign Office] in DEC 3 conversation stated (1) no question reconquest Indochina as such would be counter French public opinion and probably beyond French military resources, (2) French will continue base policy March 6 accord and modus vivendi and make every effort apply them through negotiation Vietnam, (3) French would resort forceful measures only on restricted scale in case flagrant violation agreements Vietnam, (4) d'Argenlieu's usefulness impaired by outspoken dislike Vietnam officials and replacement perhaps desirable, (5) French Communists embarrassed in pose as guardian French international interests by barrage telegraphic appeals from Vietnam. [Ambassador] will express gratification this statement French policy with observation implementation such policy should go far obviate any danger that (1) Vietnamese irreconcilables and extremists might be in position make capital of situation (2) Vietnamese might be turned irrevocably against West and toward ideologies and affiliations hostile democracies which could result perpetual foment Indochina with consequences all Southeast Asia.
Avoid impression US Govt making formal intervention this juncture. Publicity any kind would be unfortunate.
Paris be guided foregoing.
Acheson, Acting.
For a while, the French seemed genuinely interested in pursuing a policy based on the March 6 Accord and the modus vivendi, and in avoiding a test of arms with the DRV. If there were contrary utterances from some, such as Admiral d'Argenlieu, the High Commissioner of Indo-China, -- who recorded his "amazement that France has such a fine expeditionary corps in Indochina and yet its leaders prefer to negotiate rather than to fight -- there were many such as General Leclerc, who had led French forces into Hanoi on 18 March 1946, and promptly called on Ho Chi Minh, announcing every intention of honoring the March 6 Accord. "At the present time," he said, "there is no question of imposing ourselves by force on masses who desire evolution and innovation." The French Socialist Party -- the dominant political party in France -- consistently advocated conciliation during 1946. In December, 1946, even after the armed incidents in November between French and DRV armed forces in North Viet- nam, Leon Blum -- who had become Premier of France, at the head of an all Socialist Cabinet -- wrote that France had no alternative save to grant the Vietnamese independence:
There is one way and only one of preserving in Indochina the prestige of our civilization, our political and spiritual influence, and also those of our material interests which are legitimate: it is sincere agreement [with Viet Nam] on the basis of independence. . . .The Communists, the other major Leftist party in France, were also vocally conciliatory; but, expectant of controlling the government, if not alone at least as part of a coalition, they tended to be more careful than the Socialists of their ability to sway nationalist sentiment In July of 1946, L,Humanité, the Com- munist newspaper, had emphasized that the Party did not wish France to be reduced to "its own small metropolitan territory," but warned that such would be the consequence if the colonial peoples turned against France:
Are we, after having lost Syria and Lebanon yesteday, to lose Indochina tomorrow, North Africa the day after?In the National Assembly in September, 1946, a Communist deputy had declared that:
The Communists are as much as the next person for the greatness of the country. But . . . they have never ceased to affirm that the French Union . . . can only be founded on the confident, fraternal, and above all, democratic collaboration of all the peoples and races who compose it. . .
However, Ho Chi Minh was unable to capitalize upon this connection with the French Left (Ho had been one of the founding members of the French Communist Party in the early 1920's) to turn the expressed convictions of either the Socialists or the Communists to the advantage of the DRV. The Communists were not prepared to press the case for the Vietnamese at the cost of votes in France. The Socialists in power paid only lip service to conciliation, and allowed the more militant colonialists, especially those in Vietnam, to set France's policy in Indochina; thus, Admiral d'Argenlieu, not General Leclere, spoke for the French Government.
In mid-December, 1946, as soon as Blum took office, Ho sent him a telegram with proposals for easing tension in Vietnam, but the message did not reach Paris until December 26. By that time the flashpoint had been passed. In Hanoi, on 19 December 1946, Vietnamese troops, after several days of mounting animosity punctuated with violence, cut off the city's water and electricity, and attacked French posts using small arms, mortar and artillery. The issue of who was the aggressor has never been resolved. The fighting flared across North Vietnam, and two days later, the guerrilla war in South Vietnam quickened pace.
The French responded to the initial attacks with an occasional savagery which rendered increasingly remote restoration of status quo ante.
On 23 December 1946, Premier Leon Blum addressed the National Assembly on the Indochina crisis. His speech was characteristically principled, and characteristically ambiguous: he talked peace, but endorsed militant French officials in Vietnam. Although he declared that "the old colonial system founded on conquest and maintained by constraint, which tended toward exploitation of conquered lands and peoples is finished today," he also stated that:
We have been obliged to deal with violence. The men who are fighting out there, the French soldiers and the friendly populations, may count unreservedly on the vigilance and resolution of the government.
It was our common task to try everything to spare the blood of our chil dren--and also the blood that is not ours, but which is blood all the same, that of a people whose right to political liberty we recognized ten months ago, and who should keep their place in the union of peoples federated around France. . . .
Before all, order must be reestablished, peaceful order which is necessarily the basis for the execution of contracts.
Premier Blum was succeeded within a week of his speech by the first government of the Fourth Republic under Paul Ramadier. France sent three emissaries to Vietnam at this juncture: Admiral d'Argenlieu, General Leclerc, and the Socialist Minister of Overseas France, Marius Moutet. Admiral d'Argenlieu became the High Commissioner of Indochina, and accused the Vietnamese of breaking faith with France. He stated emphatically that France intended to preserve in Indochina:
. . . the maintenance and development of its present influence and of its economic interests, the protection of ethnic minorities with which it is entrusted, the care of assuring the security of strategic bases within the framework of defense of the Federation and the French Union. . . .
France does not intend in the present state of evolution of the Indochi- nese people to give them unconditional and total independence, which would only be a fiction gravely prejudicial to the interests of the two parties.
The other two representatives of France were dispatched on fact-finding missions. Their reports contained diametrically opposing policy recommendations. General Leclere wrote:
In 1947 France will no longer put down by force a grouping of 24,000,000 inhabitants which is assuming unity and in which there exists a xenophobic and perhaps a national ideal. . . .
The capital problem from now on is political. It is a question of coming to terms with an awakening xenophobic nationalism, channeling it in order to safeguard, at least in part, the rights of France.
The General had been sent to examine the military situation, and returned recommending a political solution. The Socialist Marius Moutet had been sent to inquire into the political prospects, and returned with the conclusion that only a military solution was promising. Like Admiral d'Argenlieu, Moutet believed that there could be no negotiations with Ho Chi Minh. He wrote of the "cruel disillusionment of agreements that could not be put into effect . . . ," and he declared that:
We can no longer speak of a free agreement between France and Vietnam.
Before any negotiations today, it is necessary to have a military decision. I am sorry, but one cannot commit such madness as the Vietnamese have done with impunity.
It was the politician's ideas, rather than the general's, which prevailed in Paris. Premier Ramadier--himself a Socialist--spoke of peace in Vietnam, and announced that his government favored independence and unity for Vietnam:
Independence within the French Union [and] union of the three Annamese countries, if the Annamese people desire it.
At the same time, however, his government permitted Admiral d'Argenlieu to launch a military campaign of major proportions and punitive intent.
Very early in the war, the French raised the spectre of Communist conspiracy in Vietnam. Admiral d'Argenlieu in Saigon called for an internationally concerted policy to array the Western powers against the expansion of communism in Asia, beginning with Vietnam In the National Assembly debated in March, 1947, a Rightist deputy introduced the charge that the violence in Vietnam had been directed from Moscow:
Nationalism in Indochina is a means, the end is Soviet imperialism.
Neither the government nor the people of France heeded General Leclerc's statement of January, 1947:
Anti-communism will be a useless tool as long as the problem of nationalism remains unsolved.
Ho Chi Minh, for his part, issued repeated appeals to France for peace, even offering to withdraw personally:
When France recognizes the independence and unity of Vietnam, we will retire to our village, for we are not ambitious for power or honor.
In February, 1947, the French offered terms to Ho tantamount to unconditional surrender. Ho flatly rejected these, asking the French representative, "If you were in my place, would you accept them? . . . In the French Union there is no place for cowards. If I accepted their conditions I should be one." On 1 March 1947, Ho appealed again to the French government and the French people:
Once again, we declare solemnly that the Vietnamese people desire only unity and independence in the French Union, and we pledge ourselves to respect French economic and cultural interests. If France would but say the word to cease hostility immediately, so many lives and so much property would be saved and friendship and confidence would be regained.
But the French displayed little interest in negotiations. Premier Ramadier stated in March, 1947, that:
We must protect the life and possessions of Frenchmen, of foreigners, of our Indochinese friends who have confidence in French liberty. It is necessary that we disengage our garrisons, re-establish essential communications, assure the safety of populations which have taken refuge with us. That we have done.
Ramadier and his ministers spoke repeatedly in the spring of 1947 of an imminent end to the "military phase" of the crisis, and of the beginning of a "constructive phase," in which presumably economic and political assistance would supplant the military instrument; but in what was to become a pattern of expectation and frustration, the Fourth Republic discovered that its military forces were incapable of controlling even the principal lines of communication in Vietnam, and that the military solution severely taxed the full resources of the French Union. In March, 1947 an additional division of troops for the French Expeditionary Corps, dispatched to Vietnam per General Leclerc's recommendation, had to be diverted en route to quell an insurgency in Madagascar.
By the summer of 1947, the French Government was aware that the situation in Indochina was at an impasse. Having failed in its attempt to force a military decision, it turned to a political solution, as suggested by General Leclerc. But again the ideas of Admiral d'Argenlieu weighed heavily. In January, 1947, d'Argenlieu wrote that:
If we examine the problem basically, we are led to inquire whether the political form unquestionably capable of benefiting from the political pres- tige of legitimacy is not the traditional monarchic institution, the very one that existed before the Japanese surrender. . . . The return of the Emperor [Bao Dai] would probably reassure all those who, having opposed the Viet Minh, fear they will be accused of treason.
It was with Bao Dai, not Ho Chi Minh, that the French elected to negotiate for a political settlement with Vietnamese Nationalists.
French emissaries approached Bao Dai with terms not unlike those Ho Chi Minh had negotiated on 6 March 1946: unity and independence within the French Union, provided Bao Dai formed a government which would furnish a clear alternative to Ho Chi Minh's DRV. With French encouragement, a group of Vietnamese Nationalists formed a political party advocating the installation of Bao Dai at the head of a non-Viet Minh Vietnamese regime. Bao Dai was at first evasive and skeptical, but was eventually convinced that the French situation in Indochina was sufficiently desperate that they would have to honor commitments they made to him. Bao Dai also seems to have believed that he could attract American support and material aid--a view which may have stemmed in part from a 1947 Life magazine article by William C. Bullitt, the influential former U.S. Ambassador to France, endorsing Bao Dai as a solu- tion to France's dilemma.
France then proceeded to contract with Bao Dai a series of agreements, each
of which ostensibly brought Bao Dai closer to genuine autonomy for Vietnam.
It was not, however, until February, 1950, that the French National Assembly
acceded to political independence and unification for Vietnam. Chronicled below
are the principal steps by which France failed on the one hand to reach an
accommodation with Ho Chi Minh, and on the other hand erected the "Bao
Dai solution" in its stead.
| Description | Outcome | |
| Accord of 6 March 1946 | Agreement signed by Ho Chi Minh with French provides that: 1. France recognizes DRV as: "Free State . . . forming part of the Indo- china Federation and the French Union." 2. DRV welcomes French Army into Tonkin for 5 years. 3. Further negotiations to spell out details for DRV independence. | 1. Led to French occupation of Tonkin Delta. 2. No significant step taken by France toward DRV autonomy. |
| First Dalat Conference, 19 April-ll May 1946 | French and DRV delegates attempt to negotiate differences, but are able to enact only minor agreements on cultural and educational matters. | 1. Overshadowed by continuing guerrilla war in Cochinchina. 2. A commission was set up to arrange an armistice; futile. |
| Establishment of Provisional Government of Cochinchina, 1 June 1946 | French announce formation of an inde- pendent Cochinchina within the Indo- china Federation and the French Union. [Material missing] 6. Referendum to decide Cochinchina's relationship to DRV. 7. France-DRV talks to resume in January 1947. | 1. Touched off new wave of guerrilla war in South Vietnam. 2. Possibility of divided Vietnam pressured DRV in negotiations with France; stiffened DRV attitudes. |
| "Incidents" at Haiphong, Langson, and Tourane, November, 1946 | Local disputes lead to clashes between French and DRV troops. | 1. French seized unilateral control over Haiphong and Langson. 2. French reinforcements landed at Tourane in violation of March 6 |
| Hanoi Incident, 19 December 1946 | Large-scale conflict begins, spreads throughout Vietnam. | Complete breakdown of relations between France and DRV |
| Declaration of the Freedom of Cochinchina, 4 February 1947 | French High Commissioner extends powers of the Saigon Government to include: 1. Legislative and executive action on all internal affairs. 2. Universal suffrage for election of legislature. | 1. President Le Van Hoach of Cochinchina admitted Viet Minh controlled greater part of Cochinchina. 2. Elections repeatedly postponed because of Civil disorder |
| First Ha Long Bay Agreement, 7 December 1947 | 1. Bao Dai associates himself with French-sponsored nationalist movement. 2. French promise in vague terms natonal independence for Vietnam. | 1. French took no action toward releasing their control in Vietnam. 2. Bao Dai withdrew to Europe. 3. Agreement condemned by non-Viet Minh [words missing] |
| Second Ha Long Bay Agreement, 5 June 1948 | 1. France solemnly recognizes the independence of Vietnam within the French Union. 2. Bao Dai reassociates himself with the attempt to form a nationalist government | 1. France transferred no significant political power to Viet- namese. 2. Led only to further negotiations between Bao Dai and France. |
| Elysee Agreement, 8 March 1949 | In an exchange of letters between Bao Dai and President Auriol, France: 1. Reconfirms Vietnam's status as an independent Associated State within the French Union. 2. Agrees to unifying Vietnam, and placing it under Vietnamese administration, under terms to be negotiated subsequently. 3. Retains control of Vietnamese armed forces and foreign relations. | 1. French economic and political primacy remained unchanged, even in principle. 2. Cochinchina formally merged with Annam and Tonkin in State of Vietnam in June, 1949. 3. Plans for internal administrative transfer announced 30 December 1949. 4. Practical matters of transfer of administrative functions in principal external affairs were deferred to Pau Negotiations of 1950 |
| Recognition of the Independence of the State of Vietnam, 14 June 1949 | French High Commissioner for Indochina and Emperor Bao Dai exchange letters in Saigon formalizing Elysee Agreement. | 1. Cochinchina government tendered resignation to Bao Dai, merging in principle with new State of Vietnam. |
| French Ratification of the Independence of Vietnam 2 February 1950 | Following National Assembly approval (29 January 1950), France announces ratification of the status for Vietnam. [words missing] | 1. U.S. recognized State of Vietnam (3 February 1950). 2. Details of transfer of powers strained Pau Negotiations (March-November, 1950). |
U.S. Policy toward the Conflict, 1947 - 1949
Origins of the US Involvement in Vietnam
Truman and the Occuppation of Indochina, 1945
