
While this project does not attempt to retain the original pagination of the Gravel Edition, this Table of Contents does reference the original page numbering of the Gravel Edition.
Contents of Volume l
Introduction by U.S. Senator Mike Gravel . . ix
Preface
Letter of Transmittal by Leslie H. Gelb . . xv
1. Background to the Conflict, 1940-1950 . . 1
Summary . . 1- I. Indochina in U.S. Wartime Policy, 1941-1945. . . 1
- A. Roosevelt's Trusteeship Concept . . 9
- 1. Military Strategy Pre-eminent . . 10
- 2. Failure of the Trusteeship Proposal . . 13
- B. Truman and the Occupation of Indochina, 1945 . . 15
- 1. Military Strategy Pre-eminent . . 10
- II. U.S. Neutrality in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1946-1949 . . 19
- A. Failures of Negotiated Settlement . . 19
- B. U.S. Policy Toward the Conflict, 1947-1949 . . 28
- B. U.S. Policy Toward the Conflict, 1947-1949 . . 28
- III. Origins of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam . . 34
- A. The Policy Context . . 34
- B. The U.S. Enters the War . . 40
- B. The U.S. Enters the War . . 40
- IV. The Character and Power of the Viet Minh--A Summary . . 42
- V. Ho Chi Minh: Asian Tito?--A Summary . . 47
- V. Ho Chi Minh: Asian Tito?--A Summary . . 47
2. U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954 . . 53
- Foreword . . 53
- Summary . . 53
- I. U.S. Policy and the Bao Dai Regime . . 57
- Summary . . 53
- A. The Bao Dai Solution . . 57
- B. U.S. Policy Towards Bao Dai . . 61
- B. U.S. Policy Towards Bao Dai . . 61
- II. Leverage: France Had More Than the United States . . 75
- A. American Leverage on France . . 75
- B. French Leverage on the United States . . . 78
- III. Perceptions of the Communist Threat to Southeast Asia and to Basic U.S. Interests . . 81
- A. "Domino Principle" Before Korea . . 82
- B. Importance of Indochina . . 82
- C. Impact of Start of Korean War . . 83
- D. Republican Administration and Far East . . 85
- E. Impact of Korean Armistice . . 85
- F. Deepening of U.S. Commitment to Containment . . 86
- G. Conclusion . . 87
- B. Importance of Indochina . . 82
- IV. The Interagency Debate over U.S. Intervention in Indochina . . 88
- A. The General Policy Context . . 88
- B. The Question of Intervention with Ground Forces . . 88
- C. The New Approach: "United Action" . . 93
- B. The Question of Intervention with Ground Forces . . 88
- V. The Attempt to Organize "United Action" . . 95
- A. The Berlin Conference of 1954 . . 95
- B. The Ely Mission (March 20--24) . . 97
- C. "United Action" as an Alternative to Either Negotiations or to Unilateral U.S. Intervention . . 98
- D. Final U.S. Position Before Geneva . . 104
- E. Reappraisal of Domino Theory After Dien Bien Phu . . 106
- B. The Ely Mission (March 20--24) . . 97
3. The Geneva Conference, May--July, 1954 . . 108
- I. Background to the Conference . . 108
- II. The Conduct and Structure of Diplomacy . . 110
- III. The Development of Bargaining Positions . . 115
- IV. The United States at Geneva: The Stage of Force and Diplomacy, May to Mid-June . . 122
- V. The Major Issues at the Conference, May-June . . 132
- VI. The Anglo-American Rapprochement . . 141
- VII. Toward a Settlement: The Last Thirty Days . . 146
- VIII. The Meaning of Geneva . . 165
- II. The Conduct and Structure of Diplomacy . . 110
4. U.S. and France in Inclochina, 1950--1956 . . 179
- Summary . . 179
- I. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950-1954 . . 184
- A. The American Perspective Develops . . 184
- B. The Beginning of A merican Aid . . 1 90
- II. The U.S. and France's Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1954-1956 . . 204
- Chronology . . 204
- Key Personalities, 1954-1956 . . 209
- A. Introduction: Post-Geneva Expectations . . 210
- B. Initial U.S. Policy Toward Indochina . . 211
- C. Tentative U.S. involvement Becomes Deeper, Firmer . . 215
- D. Franco-American Impasse Over Diem . . 225
- E. Crisis of the Spring, 1955 . . 229
- F. The Twilight of French Presence in Vietnam . . 239
- Key Personalities, 1954-1956 . . 209
5. Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960 . . 242
- Summary . . 242
- Table: Major Provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords . . 270
- I. Failure of the Geneva Settlement . . 283
- Table: Major Provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords . . 270
- A. Introduction: The Flawed Peace . . 283
- B. The Partition of Vietnam . . 284
- C. Refugees: Disruption of Vietnam's Society . . 289
- B. The Partition of Vietnam . . 284
- II. Rebellion Against My-Diem . . 291
- A. Diem's Political Legacy: Violence and Anti-Colonialism . . 291
- B. Ngo Dinh Diem: Basis of Power . . 296
- C. Conflict with the Armed Sects . . 303
- D. Rural Pacification . . 305
- E. Urban Political Alienation . . 314
- F. Tensions with the Armed Forces . . 322
- G. The Viet Cong . . 324
- B. Ngo Dinh Diem: Basis of Power . . 296
Documents . . 347
Justification of the War Public Statements . . 584
Glossary . . 630
